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IN THE SUPREl\iE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YERN AL STRATTON and ~EOLA 
STRATTON, hi~ wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
\VEST STATES CONSTRFCTION, 
a Utah Corporation, and JACK 
LORDS, 
Defendants and Appcllrmts. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10841 
STATEl\<IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the plaintiffs to enforce 
the provisions of a home improvement contract and 
for punitive and other damages. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury on the 19th and 20th 
days of December, 1966, and from a jury verdict in the 
sum of $6,900.00 this appeal is taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants seek a reversal of the order of the 
court denying the defendants' motion for a summary 
judgment heard on the 21st day of November, 1966, 
a reversal of the court's order denying the defendants' 
motion for dismissal of the individual defendant Jack 
Lords, for a directed verdict, to alter or amend the 
judgment, and for an order remanding the case back 
for dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The corporate defendant is in the home improve-
ment business. The individual defendant Jack Lords 
is its president. The action was brought against the 
salesmen and others, but these are the only two served. 
The contract sued upon was signed by both plaintiffs 
and by Richard Lee, named in the complaint but not 
served, for the corporate defendant. It contained a 
provision not in the copy of the contract furnished 
the corporate defendant in the following words: "Cus-
tomer will receive total of 26 paid units-RC 200.00 
each," a fact not known by the defendant until its work 
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had been substantially completed. Both contracts are 
m evidence exhibits I and 20. 
After the plaintiff's had refused payment of the 
contract, the corporate defendant caused a lien to be 
recorded against the plaintiffs' property as did three 
other suppliers, exhibits 4 to 7 inclusive. 
After some correspondence back and forth between 
attorneys the following letter was received from Rob-
ert L. Gardner, the attorney for the plaintiffs, dated 
February 4, 1966: 
"After discussing the matter involving Mr. 
Stratton and the 'Vestern States Construction 
Company with Mr. Stratton, we have concluded 
that the best solution to the matter is to settle 
with 'Vestern States. 'Vith this view in mind, 
I am authorized to instruct you that we will place 
the $2650.00 in escrow at the State Bank of 
Southern Utah here in Cedar City, or with such 
other escrow as we can agree upon with the un-
derstanding that 'Vestern States Construction 
Company is to furnish lien waivers from all of 
the materialmen and laborers involved to the 
escrow at which time the balance of the money 
will be paid over. 
"In addition to that, we would like to have a 
copy of the contract which 'i\T estern St~tes Con-
struction CompJJ,ny alleges was prefabricated by 
their salesmen and upon which they proceeded 
with the work. 
"Your cooperation and prompt attention to 
this matter will be appreciated." (Exhibit 3). 
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An acceptance of this proposal was made by phone 
and Jack Lords met with Mr. Gardner and the plain-
tiff, Vernal Stratton, and fully complied with the con-
ditions of the offer, (Tr. 242) February 17, 1966. 
The plaintiffs caused the lien waivers that had been 
obtained from the corporate defendant to be placed of 
record on the 10th day of March, 1966, Exhibits 13 to 
16 inclusive, and on or about the 7th day of July, 1966, 
caused this action to be filed. 
The defendants' motion for summary judgment 
was heard on the 21st day of November, 1966, sup-
ported by the affidavit of Jack Lords and the testimony 
of Robert L. Gardner and Vernal Stratton, (R-21), 
the transcript of which testimony, though the entire 
record was designated, does not seem to have been filed 
as yet, nor the court's ruling though this attorney was 
advised by the court that the motion had been denied. 
(R-60). 
After the presentation of the plaintiffs' proofs, a 
motion to dismiss as against Jack Lords personally 
was denied, and at the conclusion of the case the de-
fendants' motion for a directed verdict was denied. A 
motion by the defendants to alter or amend the judg-
ment as to the individual defendant Jack Lords was 
likewise denied. (R-60). 
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ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING OR 
REFUSING TO FIND THAT THERE 'VAS 
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
A settlement of the controversy between the parties 
was offered in the plaintiffs' letter of February 4th, 
1966, (Ex. 3 and R-17 and Tr-177). It was accepted 
by the defendants (Tr. 242), and it was carried out 
on the 17th day of February, 1966 (Tr. 243). All of 
the elements of an accord and satisfaction were present. 
The law is fully stated in the case of Salisbury 
v. Tibbetts, 259 Fed.2nd, 59, from pages 63 and 64: 
"The general rule established by many of the 
adjudicated cases and followed in Utah is that 
a discharge by accord and satisfaction must rest 
upon a contract, express or implied, and the 
essentials to a valid contract generally must be 
present, that is ( 1) a proper subject matter, 
( 2) competent parties, ( 3) an assent or meeting 
of the minds of the parties and ( 4) a considera-
tion. 
"In Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 91 
U. 405, 64 P.2nd 351, 363, the court defined 
accord and satisfaction as follows: 
" 'The definition of an accord and satisfaction 
is: An accord is an agreement whereby one of 
the parties undertakes to give or perform, and 
the other to accept in satisfaction of a claim, 
liquidated or in dispute and arising either from 
contract or from tort, something other than or 
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different from what he is or considers himself 
to he entitled to. And a satisfaction is the execu-
tion of such an agreement.' 
'"l'he evidence clearly established that San-
ford and Tibbetts asserted that they were en-
titled to receive and demanded 1,200 shares of 
the voting stock. Salisbury denied that they were 
so entitled and stated that their demand was 
ridiculous. Even if we assume, although we have 
decided otherwise, that the inferences which the 
trial court drew from the conversations between 
the parties were permissible, there can be no 
doubt that such conversations fully warranted 
a good faith denial by Salisbury of the claims 
asserted bv -Sanford and Tibbetts. The evidence 
established a bona fide dispute between the par-
ties. Salisbury made an unequivocal offer to 
settle the dispute by selling to Sanford and Tib-
betts 100 shares each of the voting stock at 
$10.00 per share. Sanford and Tibbetts un-
equivocally accepted such offer. The compromise 
agreement was carried out and thereupon there 
was an accord and satisfaction." 
POINT II. 
THE COURT IN DENYING THE DE-
FENDANTS' :MOTION TO DISMISS AS 
AGAINST JACK LORDS INDIVIDUALLY 
A:N"D IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS' 
:MOTION TO ALTER OR MODIFY THE 
JUDGl\lENT SO AS TO EXCLUDE HIM. 
The contract sued upon in this case was on the 
printed form of the defendant, West States Construe· 
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tion, a dba of the 'Vestern States \Vholesale Supply, 
which is a Utah Corporation. It was signed by Richard 
Lee, an independent agent of the \Vestern States 
\ Vholesale Supply ( 'fr.-204), a named defendant who 
was not served. It was not signed by the defendant 
Jack Lords. He was 11ot present when the contract was 
negotiated or signed. There is no evidence to tie him 
into the transaction personally. He was the president 
of the corporation but he did not own the controlling 
interest in its stock. (Tr.-202). He was an employee of 
the corporation. 
A motion was made for the dismissal of the case 
against Jack Lords personally at the conclusion of the 
plaintiffs' case, a motion for a directed verdict at the 
conclusion of the controversy, (R-60) and a motion 
to alter or amend the judgment after the verdict had 
been entered ( R-62) . Each of the three motions was 
denied (R-60, R-63, 64). 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE JURY. 
The defendants assert that the court's instructions 
to the jury, taken as a whole, were incorrect and preju-
dicial and especially in the following three particulars: 
l. Instruction number 5 was submitted to the jury 
in part as follows ( R-20) : 
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"The defendants, and each of them by their 
pleadings in this case in substanc~ and effect 
admit that a contract was entered mto between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants for the fur-
nishing of labor and materials for work upon 
the plaintiffs' home in Cedar City, Utah." 
This is an incorrect statement so far as the indi-
vidual defendant Jack Lords is concerned. It is sub-
mitted as being extremely misleading and prejudicial. 
2. Instruction number 14, R-39), having to do with 
the provisions of 14-2-2 of the U.C.A., 1953, is sub-
mitted as being irrelevant and immaterial in this case 
and very prejudicial to the defendants. 
3. Instruction number 17 was submitted to the 
jury in whole as follows: 
"If you should find that plaintiffs are entitled 
to recover against both defendants you may not 
allocate the damages between them, but you must 
deliver a verdict in one single sum against both 
defendants whom you find to be liable." (R-42). 
This instruction, especially in view of instruction 
number 16, (R-41), on punitive damages, ties the indi-
vidual defendant Jack Lords to the corporate defend· 
ant in such a way as to be prejudicial against the indi· 
vidual defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
There was a completed accord and satisfaction in 
this case. The court erred in denying the defendants' 
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motion for summary judgment on the 21st day of 
November, 1966, (R-21), and again when the matter 
was called up on the defendants' motion for a directed 
verdict on the 20th of December, 1966 at the conclusion 
of the trial of the case. ( R-60) . 
There was no evidence tying the individual de-
fendant, Jack Lords, into the case. The court erred in 
denying the motion of the defendant to dismiss against 
him at the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case (R-60). 
The court erred in its instructions to the jury, 
numbers 5, (R-29), 14, (R-39), and 17, (R-42). 
The decisions should be reversed and the case re-
manded for dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Horace J. Knowlton 
214 Tenth Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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